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I. Introduction
From corporate financiers to portfolio managers, most
finance practitioners regard the risk of loss as the true
financial risk. On the other hand, mainstream financial
research often uses the variance as the metric for risk.
Although the variance provides a sense of the possible
losses an investor might sustain, it also accounts for
the potential profit an investor might earn. To many
investors, upside volatility is a sweetener, and financial
markets are volatile only when prices are falling.1
Thus, risk as defined in the research literature seems
to be at odds with risk as perceived in the markets.
Although escalating concerns about potential loss
may be related to increasing risk, it is not clear if
mounting optimism about potential profit has the op-
posite relation to decreasing risk. The behavioral fi-
nance literature posits a phenomenon known as “loss
aversion” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), in which
losses loom larger than gains. Loss aversion could
translate into a greater responsiveness of downside
* This article is developed from a chapter of my Ph.D. disser-
tation at Yale University. I am grateful to Will Goetzmann and Jon
Ingersoll for their guidance. I especially thank an anonymous ref-
eree for many suggestions that significantly improved the article.
I also thank Roger Ibbotson, Zoran Ivkovich, Subhankar Nayak,
and seminar participants at the 2000 Financial Management As-
sociation and 2001 American Finance Association meetings for
helpful comments. I acknowledge financial support from a research
grant awarded by the National University of Singapore. Contact the
author at cheekiat@nus.edu.sg.
1. For example, see Bubble babble, Economist, December 5,
1998.
I study the relation be-




tends to increase when
downside volatility in-
creases more than upside
volatility. The risk-return
relation is asymmetric
and nonlinear, best de-
scribed as a downward-
sloping reclined S-curve.
That prior gains appear
to have some mitigating
effect on the fear of loss
relative to prior losses
points to a “house
money” effect. Broader
market conditions influ-
ence the perception of
risk in a manner consis-
tent with the “keeping up
with the Joneses” effect.
Leverage is a weak ex-
planation for the risk-re-
turn relation.
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price pressure on raising risk relative to the responsiveness of upside price
pressure on lowering risk. The popular press often portrays financial markets
as subject to fear (extreme downside risk) and exuberance (extreme upside
potential). Although we frequently see sharp drops and strong run-ups in daily
asset prices, the empirical relation between changes in risk perception and
extreme changes in prices is not well documented.
In this article, I investigate the relation between changes in risk perception
and changes in prices, and I compare the sensitivities of risk perception to
extreme changes in prices. The S&P 100 index options traded on the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) provides a useful means of answering these
questions. The CBOE constructs an implied Volatility Index (VIX) from these
American-style option prices. Computed from the most actively traded index
option market in the world, the VIX represents the option traders’ best guess
of risk in the S&P 100. The VIX has also been nicknamed “the fear gauge”
or “the sentiment index” by the Wall Street Journal. For measuring a market’s
perception of risk from empirical data, the VIX is arguably as good as it gets.
Many studies examine the relation between risk and return by using vol-
atility metrics that are statistically estimated from historical data. Statistical
estimation generally produces two types of errors, sampling errors and model
misspecification errors. The VIX is different from these volatility estimates.
It is not a statistical estimate but a quantity backed out from an option-pricing
model. Therefore, sampling error is no longer an issue. Moreover, if the model
is robust to small variations in specification and is widely used by traders in
setting prices (i.e., the market uses a similar model), then the error due to
model misspecification will be small. The tremendous depth of this index
option market ensures that the transacted prices are representative of the
aggregate consensus.
Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1995) are the first to employ the VIX as
a measure of expected volatility. I aim to extend the literature by investigating
the nonlinearity in the relation between the perception of risk, using the VIX
as a proxy, and the contemporaneous conditions of the market. I evaluate the
tendency of option traders toward fear or exuberance by exploring the nature
of the nonlinearity in the relation, if it exists. I do so by defining fear as
accelerating increases (convexity) in the VIX and exuberance as accelerating
decreases (concavity) in the VIX.
The literature traditionally favors leverage as a nonbehavioral explanation
for the risk-return relation. In this article, separating the S&P 100 constituent
stocks by leverage provides an empirical test of this hypothesis. I can directly
test the leverage hypothesis by comparing the risk-return responsiveness of
portfolios of S&P 100 constituent stocks sorted by leverage. If leverage is
indeed a link, the risk-return relation of high-leverage stocks should be stronger
and steeper than that of low-leverage stocks.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to show causality in a contemporaneous
relation. I do not try to do it here. Rather, my objective is to provide a better
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understanding of the relation between the perception of risk by sophisticated
market participants and the current conditions of the market. The primary
motivation is to provide evidence on whether the true financial risk is semi-
dimensional in nature.
The incremental contribution of this article is fourfold. I discover that the
risk-return relation is not only asymmetric but also nonlinear, best described
as a downward-sloping reclined S-curve. By conditioning on the signs of
lagged returns, I find that consecutive price falls increase the fear of risk, and
consecutive price run-ups somewhat reinforce exuberance. Broader market
conditions also appear to have an influence on the perception of risk. And
leverage is a plausible but weak nonbehavioral explanation for the risk-return
relation.
This article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the risk-return re-
lation in the literature and discusses previous studies of implied volatility and
the VIX. Section III describes the data used in this study. Section IV inves-
tigates the asymmetry and nonlinearity in the risk-return relation. Sections V
and VI examine the influence of previous market conditions and broader
market conditions on the risk-return relation. Section VII tests the leverage
hypothesis. Section VIII summarizes and concludes the investigation.
II. The Risk-Return Relation
Past research finds inconclusive evidence of the relation between volatility
and returns. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) discover a positive ex
ante relation between the expected risk premium and predictable volatility
but a negative ex post relation between excess holding period returns and the
unpredictable component of volatility. Schwert (1989, 1990) finds an asym-
metry in the volatility-return relation. He documents larger increases in vol-
atility corresponding to negative returns than decreases in volatility corre-
sponding to similar magnitude positive returns.
Baillie and DeGennaro (1990) use GARCH (generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity) models with daily and monthly stock returns
data to conclude that the relation between volatility and returns is weak. They
suggest that some risk measure other than variance or standard deviation
should be considered.
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) also use GARCH models, but
they find a negative relation between return and variance with monthly data.
More important, their GARCH models accommodate the asymmetry that may
exist between conditional volatility and negative or positive unanticipated
returns. Their key result is that positive unanticipated returns are related to a
downward revision of conditional volatility while negative unanticipated re-
turns are related to an upward revision of conditional volatility.
Braun, Nelson, and Sunier (1995) propose an asymmetric GARCH model
as an alternative to that of Glosten et al. (1993). They report that, at the market
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level, volatility tends to rise strongly in response to bad news and fall in
response to good news. However, this asymmetry is not present in portfolios
formed according to SIC codes.
In the literature, the leading nonbehavioral explanation for the negative
relation between contemporaneous volatility and returns involves financial
and operating leverage. This leverage hypothesis was first proposed by Black
(1976).
Christie (1982) investigates the financial leverage hypothesis and finds that
it can substantially explain the negative relation. He demonstrates that vola-
tility increases with financial leverage and this relation gives rise to the neg-
ative elasticity of volatility with the value of equity. However, the operating
leverage hypothesis has been relatively unexplored in the empirical literature.
A. Implied Volatility
The studies just discussed use statistically estimated volatilities as proxies for
risk. With increasing trading activity in the options market, the volatility
implied by option prices might provide additional information and power in
forecasting volatility. Moreover, since it is not a statistical estimate, implied
volatility does not incur traditional estimation errors. Model misspecification
error is small relative to statistical volatility metrics, insofar as the chosen
option-pricing model is robust and widely used in the market.
Harvey and Whaley (1991, 1992a, 1992b) develop a numerical binomial
option-pricing model with a cash-dividend adjustment for the S&P 100 index
option. They use this model to construct a series of implied volatility from
the observed option prices. They find that the S&P 100 index option market
is efficient, in the sense that, after costs, a trading strategy based on implied
volatility does not generate abnormal returns.
The informational content of implied volatility is also the subject of many
studies. Three recent and representative works are by Canina and Figlewski
(1993), Christensen and Prabhala (1998), and Fleming (1998). Canina and
Figlewski find that the implied volatility of the S&P 100 options is a poor
forecast of subsequent volatility and contains little information from recent
volatility. They construct implied volatilities from a binomial model that al-
lows for early exercise. Christensen and Prabhala highlight a flaw in the
sampling methodology of the Canina and Figlewski paper and report that,
when they use nonoverlapping data, implied volatility outperforms past vol-
atility in forecasting future volatility. They construct implied volatilities from
the Black and Scholes (1973) European-style option-pricing model and show
that the information content of past volatility is largely subsumed in implied
volatility. Fleming (1998) provides comprehensive empirical evidence to sup-
port the use of the S&P 100 implied volatility as a proxy for conditional
volatility. He suggests that the implied volatility may be applied to measure
market sentiment, evaluate asset-pricing models, and predict returns.
Comparing option implied volatility with past and future realized stock
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volatility raises the possibility of a spurious lead-lag relation between option
price changes and stock price changes. Stephan and Whaley (1990) document
a stock price lead over the option price of about 15–20 minutes. Chan, Chung,
and Johnson (1993) confirm the stock price lead and show that the lead is a
spurious one. They find that the lead arises because the tick-size-to-price ratios
in the option market are larger than those in the stock market. This differential
in relative tick sizes induces less frequent trading of options relative to stocks.
This lead disappears (i.e., the price changes in the option and stock markets
are contemporaneous) when averages of bid and ask quotes are used. Because
the VIX is constructed from midpoints of bid and ask quotes, the concern
over the authenticity of any lead-lag effect found using the VIX should be
alleviated.
For a stock index, the index level is always a stale indicator of the true
level, because some component stocks are traded less frequently than the
others. As a result, stock index option price changes are likely to artificially
lead stock index level changes.2 Nevertheless, because the S&P 100 constituent
stocks are among the most heavily traded stocks in the market, any spuri-
ousness of the lead of S&P 100 index options, if it exists, is minuscule in
size (in small fractions of an hour) and should not be significant with daily
data.
B. The VIX
Whaley (1993) provides details of the construction of the VIX. Briefly, the
VIX is a weighted average of volatilities implied from four call and four put
options on the S&P 100. These eight options are closest to being at the money.3
The weighting scheme is such that the composite quantity represents the
implied volatility of a hypothetical 30-calendar-day (22-trading-day) at-the-
money S&P 100 option. The underlying American-style option-pricing model
is a cash-dividend-adjusted binomial approximation model developed in Har-
vey and Whaley (1992a).
Fleming et al. (1995) present the first comprehensive investigation of the
statistical properties and predictive power of the VIX. They discover an asym-
metry in the volatility-return relation similar to that documented by Schwert
(1989, 1990). Whereas Schwert uses stock return data to measure volatility,
Fleming et al. use the VIX as a novel measure of volatility. Their results also
show that the VIX is a good, but biased, predictor of future volatility.
Regardless of its forecast accuracy, the VIX represents the option traders’
best guess, collectively, of the volatility of the S&P 100 over the next 30
days. The VIX increases with the prices of the options, and the weighting
2. I thank the referee for pointing this out.
3. Since the options are closest to at-the-money, I can interpret the VIX as the “average
volatility” expected over the next 30 days under a stochastic volatility assumption. This inter-
pretation follows from the results of Hull and White (1987), who show that, if the volatility is
not correlated with the stock price and aggregate consumption, the option price is the Black and
Scholes (1973) price integrated over the distribution of the average variances.
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scheme results in approximately equal contribution from the call prices versus
the put prices. Therefore, when shocks that have an impact on the market
lead to a greater change in magnitude in prices of one type of options relative
to the other, the VIX adjusts along the direction of the net change.
For example, if a negative shock leads option traders to believe that the
market is turning bearish, the result could be increases in put prices and
decreases in call prices. If the overall magnitude of price changes of put
options jointly is greater than that of call options jointly, the net effect on the
VIX is an increase. On the other hand, a positive (bullish) shock may result
in less demand for put options and lower put prices. If the overall magnitude
of decreases in put prices is greater than increases in call prices, the VIX
falls.
Thus, the VIX encompasses both the fear and exuberance of a sample of
sophisticated, well-informed professional market participants. It is an excellent
tool with which to investigate the nature of the relationship between the market
perception of risk and current market conditions.
Another advantage of the VIX is that it is a quantity directly implied from
actual option prices. The assumed option-pricing model is a robust model
widely applied in the market. As a result, the VIX is relatively free from the
statistical errors typical in traditional risk-return studies.
III. Data
I use the VIX, which is downloaded from the CBOE website (http://
www.cboe.com), as my proxy for the market’s perception of risk for the S&P
100. The full historical daily series begins on January 2, 1986. I obtain the
S&P 100 daily closing levels from Datastream. I compute daily close-to-close
percentage changes of the VIX and the S&P 100 over 1986–98.
I obtain the accounting data required for the construction of year-end lev-
erage ratios for the firms in the S&P 100 from Compustat. The two leverage
ratios are financial leverage TD/ME, which I define as (debt in current
term debt)/market equity; and operating leverage PPE/sales,liabilities long
which I define as (net plant, property, equipment)/net sales.
I obtain the full history of membership changes in the S&P 100 directly
from Standard & Poor’s, and daily stock returns and market value of equity
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
IV. Semidimensions of Risk
A. Upside and Downside Volatility
To provide an initial perspective on the upside or downside orientation of the
VIX, I compute the correlation between the VIX on day t and the spread in
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1.—Correlation of the VIX and realized standard semideviations of the S&P
100 returns in rolling 30-day windows.This figure shows the coefficients of correlation
between the VIXt and annualized standard semideviation of the S&P 100 daily returns
in the window [ , ], where l is on the horizontal axis. I define the standardt l t l 29
semideviations as: ; ; and2 2ssd E[max (r, 0) ] ssd E[min (r, 0) ] ssdGAP
. The bold line tracks the coefficients of correlation between VIXt andssd ssd
.ssdGAP[t l,t l 29]
upside and downside standard semideviations of the S&P 100 returns, defined
as
ssd ssd ssd ,GAP
2ssd E[max (r, 0) ], (1)
2ssd E[min (r, 0) ].
The standard semideviations are computed in rolling 30-day windows. Each
window covers the period from day to day , where l rangest l t l 29
from 100 to 30. The rolling windows provide an ex post look at the upside-
downside orientation of the VIX.
A lower ssdGAP indicates stronger downside than upside return volatility in
the window period. A negative correlation between the VIX and ssdGAP in-
dicates that the VIX tends to increase when downside return volatility increases
more than upside return volatility.
Figure 1 plots the rolling correlation. The correlation coefficients peak in
the window [ , ] and [ , t] for ssd and ssd , respectively.t 21 t 8 t 29
More important, in the case of ssdGAP, the correlation coefficients are negative,
bottoming to 0.50 in the window [ , ].t 28 t 1
When downside volatility increases more than upside volatility (i.e., de-
creasing ssdGAP), the VIX tends to increase. This negative correlation is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that markets are volatile only when prices are
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TABLE 1 Results of Regressions of Percentage Changes in the VIX on
Contemporaneous S&P 100 Returns
Regression Constant r r r R2
A .01 5.27 .46
(5.27) ( 53.23)
B .03 8.55 .59
( 12.14) ( 46.75)
C .01 2.46 .13
( 4.84) ( 16.57)
Constant r (r )2 r (r )2 R2
D .00 3.17 58.24 .77
(2.39) ( 15.35) (34.44)
E .01 1.57 27.26 .14
( 6.26) ( 5.97) ( 4.21)
This table reports results of regressing daily percentage changes in the VIXt on contemporaneous
S&P 100 returns rt. The regression equations are A: ; B: ; C:%VIX r %VIX rt A A t t B B t
; D: ; E: . and2 2%VIX r %VIX r (r ) %VIX r (r ) %VIXt C C t t D D1 t D2 t t E E1 t E2 t t
are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when . and are %VIXt and rt reduced byr r 0 %VIX rt t t t
removing the days when . t-statistics are in parentheses.r 0t
falling and provides preliminary evidence that the risk perception of option
traders is indeed semidimensional in nature.
B. Contemporaneous Risk-Return Relation
I also use regression to investigate the contemporaneous relation between
changes in the VIX and the S&P 100 returns. Table 1 presents the results
from regressing percentage changes in the VIX on contemporaneous S&P 100
returns. The slope in the univariate linear regression is negative and significant
(row A), implying that the VIX goes up on the days when S&P 100 returns
are negative and down on the days when S&P 100 returns are positive.
To accommodate the possibility of asymmetry, I run a two-partition asym-
metric regression with returns separated into upside and downside partitions.
The regression equation is
%VIX max (r , 0) min (r , 0) D , (2)t t t
where D is an indicator variable for . This regression is equivalent tor 0t
two separate regressions of the following form:
%VIX r ,t t
%VIX r . (3)t t
Here, and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when%VIX rt t
; and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days whenr 0 %VIX rt t t
.r 0t
Table 1 also reports results from the two-partition asymmetric regressions.
The R2 in the downside return partition (row B) is higher than the R2 in the
upside return partition (row C). The downside slope is steeper than the upside
slope. The difference in slopes is highly statistically sig-( 6.08)
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2.—Scatter plot of percentage changes in the VIX on the S&P 100 returns.
This figure shows the scatter plot and ordinary least squares (OLS) fitted linear and
quadratic lines from regressing daily percentage changes in the VIX on contempo-
raneous S&P 100 daily returns. I fit the linear (broken) line from regressions B, C in
table 1. I fit the quadratic (solid) line from regressions D, E in table 1.
nificant, as evaluated from the following incremental effects regression equa-
tion:
0.03 0.02 8.55 6.08%VIX D r rD , (4)t t t( 14.50) (7.29) ( 55.85) (25.27)
where D is an indicator variable for . The t-statistics appear inr 0t
parentheses.
Figure 2 shows the scatter plot and the fitted lines. The steeper relation in
the downside return partition suggests that the VIX is more sensitive to price
drops than price rises. It is apparent from the figure that the point corresponding
to October 19, 1987, is an outlier. I check the robustness of the results by
repeating the study without the entire month of October 1987. The kink
(asymmetry) is preserved. The difference in slopes is smaller (
but remains highly statistically significant ( ).3.28) t 14.28
Fleming et al. (1995) are the first to discover the kinked risk-return relation
in linear form. They use the following regression equation:
2
VIX VIX r r (5)t t 1 S, i t i S t
i 2
This content downloaded from 137.132.123.69 on Thu, 02 Jun 2016 08:30:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
536 Journal of Business
and report that, using daily data, and is highly statistically75.55S,t
significant, and and also is statistically significant. Their result30.11S
shows that a 1% positive daily S&P 100 return corresponds to a contempo-
raneous fall of 45 basis points in the VIX while a 1% negative return cor-
responds to an asymmetric contemporaneous rise of 105 basis points in the
VIX. Fleming et al. then proceed to investigate the predictive power of the
VIX and do not examine this asymmetry further.
This asymmetry is similar to the phenomenon of loss aversion in Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. Here, instead of a value function, we
have a metric that is often regarded as a fear gauge or a sentiment index.
C. Reclined S-Curve
In table 1, rows D and E add a quadratic term to each downside or upside
return partition. The results show that the downside partition has a convex
profile and the upside partition has a concave profile. This nonlinear relation
is best described as a downward-sloping reclined S-curve. The quadratic fit
in the downside return partition is especially strong ( ). Earlier, I2R 0.77
defined fear as accelerating increases in the VIX and exuberance as accel-
erating decreases in the VIX. Convexity in the downside return partition
indicates accelerating increases in the VIX; and concavity in the upside return
partition indicates accelerating decreases in the VIX.
When I check the robustness of the results by repeating the study without
October 1987, the curvature remains convex in the downside partition and
concave in the upside partition. The general shape of the downward-sloping
reclined S-curve is preserved. However, the statistical significance of the
concavity is diminished. It is not clear whether the removal of outliers is
appropriate. Since my objective in this study is to have a complete picture of
the (possibly nonlinear) association between risk perception and contempo-
raneous returns, these rare and extreme events are very informative.
To facilitate the statistical comparison of the sensitivities of the VIX to
extreme returns, I further refine the partitions to include an extreme tail on
each downside or upside partition. The four-partition asymmetric regression
equations are
X(D )%VIX r ,t t
O(D )%VIX r ,t t
O(U )%VIX r , (6)t t
X(U )%VIX r .t t
Here, and are %VIXt and rt in days of the extreme 5 percentiles%VIX rt t
of negative rt; and are %VIXt and rt in days of the remaining 95%VIX rt t
percentiles of negative rt; and are %VIXt and rt in days of the%VIX rt t
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TABLE 2 Results of Four-Partition Asymmetric Regressions of Percentage
Changes in the VIX on Contemporaneous S&P 100 Returns
Regression Constant r r r r R2
DX .24 13.62 .77
( 6.92) ( 15.71)
DO .00 4.83 .25
( 1.16) ( 21.65)
UO .01 2.39 .09
( 5.02) ( 11.12)
UX .07 5.01 .35
(3.43) ( 6.84)
This table reports results of regressing daily percentage changes in the VIXt on four partitions of
the S&P 100 daily returns rt. The regression equations are DX: ; DO:%VIX r %VIXt t t
; UO: ; and UX: . Here, and are %VIXtr %VIX r %VIX r %VIX rt t t t t t t
and rt in days of the extreme 5 percentiles of negative rt; and are %VIXt and rt in days of the%VIX rt t
remaining 95 percentiles of negative rt; and are %VIXt and rt in days of the extreme 5 percentiles%VIX rt t
of positive rt; and are %VIXt and rt in days of the remaining 95 percentiles of positive rt; t-statistics%VIX rt t
are in parentheses.
extreme 5 percentiles of positive rt; and are %VIXt and rt in days%VIX rt t
of the remaining 95 percentiles of positive rt.
Table 2 reports results from the four-partition asymmetric regressions. The
extreme downside slope is the steepest ( ). The extreme down-13.62
side return partition also has the best fit ( ). Again, convexity is2R 0.77
observed in the downside partition, where . The difference is0
significant.4 I observe concavity in the upside partition, . Here,0
too, the difference is significant.
The form of the nonlinearity supports the existence of fear and exuberance.
I also note that the extreme downside slope is significantly steeper than the
extreme upside slope ( ). I interpret this to mean that option0
traders are more likely to panic when returns are extremely bad than become
exuberant when returns are extremely good.
The association between falling prices and increasing risk is stronger (higher
R2) and more sensitive (steeper slope) than the association between rising
prices and diminishing risk. This supports the proposition that downside vol-
atility matters more than upside volatility in the market’s perception of risk.
V. Previous Market Conditions
I examine the possibility that previous market conditions can also influence
option traders’ perception of risk. A consecutive series of undesirable events
could fuel fear. A run of desirable events might boost exuberance. Therefore,
4. To test for the statistical significance of differences in the slopes of the two regression
equations and , I stack the vectors asy x y x1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
y 1 1 x x⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤1 1 1⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ .2 d 2 dy 1 0 x 0⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦2 2
Here, d and d are the differences ( ) and ( ), respectively.1 2 1 2
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TABLE 3 Results of Two-Partition Asymmetric Regressions of Percentage
Changes in the VIX on Contemporaneous S&P 100 Returns
Conditioned on Positive or Negative Lagged-1-Day Returns
Regression Constant r r R2
A. Conditioned on negative
lagged-1-day returns:
A .05 10.57 .72
( 12.85) ( 41.24)
B .02 2.34 .14
( 7.68) ( 11.27)
B. Conditioned on positive
lagged-1-day returns:
C .00 4.63 .35
(.81) ( 20.90)
D .00 2.54 .14
(.06) ( 12.28)
This table reports results from conditional two-partition asymmetric regressions of daily percentage
changes in the VIX on contemporaneous S&P 100 daily returns rt. The regression equations are A:
; B: ; C:%VIX r , conditioned on r 0 %VIX r , conditioned on r 0t t t 1 t t t 1
; and D: . Here,%VIX r , conditioned on r 0 %VIX r , conditioned on r 0t t t 1 t t t 1
and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when ; and are %VIXt and%VIX r r 0 %VIX rt t t t t
rt reduced by removing the days when ; t-statistics are in parentheses.r 0t
I repeat the asymmetric regressions on two subsamples that I obtain by con-
ditioning the original sample on the signs of lagged-1-day returns rt 1. I test
the effect of previous market conditions on the perception of risk by comparing
the slopes of matching partitions across these two subsamples.
A. Two Partitions of Returns
Table 3 reports results from the conditional two-partition asymmetric regres-
sions. The slope in the contemporaneous downside return partition is 10.57
for the negative rt 1 subsample and 4.63 for the positive rt 1 subsample.
The difference of 5.94 is highly statistically significant with a t-statistic of
16.55 (see n. 4). Such difference in slopes supports the hypothesis that fear
increases more rapidly when prices are falling 2 days in a row.
On the other hand, the slope in the contemporaneous upside return partition
is 2.54 for the positive lagged returns subsample and 2.34 for the negative
lagged returns subsample. The difference of 0.19 has a t-statistic of 0.66,
which implies that the risk-return relation in the upside partition remains
unchanged, regardless of previous market conditions.
B. Reclined S-Curve
I summarize the risk-return relation conditional on previous market conditions
with a picture of fitted quadratic curves in the downside and upside return
partitions for the two subsamples. Figure 3 shows that the curve in the down-
side return partition is convex when it is conditioned on negative rt 1 but
slightly concave when conditioned on positive rt 1, indicating fear when prices
fall on two consecutive days. The curve in the upside return partition is
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3.—OLS-fitted quadratic curves from regressions of percentage changes in the
VIX on two partitions of S&P 100 returns conditioned on positive or negative lagged-
1-day returns. This figure shows the OLS-fitted quadratic curves of regressing daily
percentage changes in the VIX on contemporaneous S&P 100 returns rt. The curves
are fitted from the regression equations ,2%VIX 0.00 3.79r 57.16(r )t t t
, conditional on (solid line);2R 0.88 r 0 %VIX 0.00 5.24rt 1 t t
, , conditional on (broken line);2 214.76(r ) R 0.35 r 0 %VIX 0.01t t 1 t
, , conditional on (solid line); and2 23.10r 22.72(r ) R 0.14 r 0 %VIXt t t 1 t
, , conditional on (broken line). Here,2 20.00 0.66r 55.02(r ) R 0.18 r 0t t t 1
and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when and%VIX r r 0t t t
and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when .%VIX r r 0t t t
concave when it is conditioned on positive lagged returns but slightly convex
when conditioned on negative lagged returns, indicating exuberance when
prices rise on two consecutive days.
Although the curvatures for consecutive downside returns and consecutive
upside returns are similar in magnitude (square-coefficients of 57.16 and
55.02), the fit is overwhelmingly stronger for the negative momentum case
than the positive momentum case (R2 of 0.88 vs. 0.18). Previous conditions
appear to influence the risk-return relation, and the effect is relatively stronger
in a negative run than a positive run.
When it is preceded by negative rather than positive (lagged) returns, the
higher convexity in the downside return partition implies that loss aversion
is heightened in the presence of a previous loss and mitigated in the presence
of a previous gain. The empirical observation that a loss preceded by a prior
gain is less painful than two losses in a row is consistent with what Thaler
and Johnson (1990) call the “house money” effect.
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VI. Broader Market Conditions
In addition to previous market conditions, broader market conditions may also
have an impact on the risk-return relation between the VIX and S&P 100.
For example, when the S&P 100 performs worse than the broader market,
the option traders may experience a sharper perception of risk. Conversely,
when the S&P 100 performs better than the broader market, their perception
of risk may be alleviated. The option traders can be thought of as trying to
“keep up with the Joneses.” In other words, the traders behave as if they are
benchmarking the performance of the S&P 100 relative to the rest of the
investment universe.
In the consumption-based asset-pricing literature, Abel (1990) and Gali
(1994) introduce consumption externalities into standard asset-pricing models.
They set up preference functions that are defined not only on the agent’s own
consumption but also on consumption in the broader economy. For individuals
who benchmark their standard of living relative to the rest of the households
in the economy, consumption externalities have a positive effect on their
marginal utility of consumption. That is, a rise in aggregate consumption
increases their value of each additional consumption. The additional con-
sumption helps them “keep up with the Joneses.”
In the context of this article, the behavior of “keeping up with the Joneses”
predicts a steeper risk-return relation when the broader market performs better
than the S&P 100: any loss in the S&P 100 is more painful and any gain
more sweet when there is a need to keep up with the better-performing broader
market.
To investigate the influence of broader market conditions, I choose the
value-weighted CRSP all-security index as the proxy for the broader market.5
This index comprises a comprehensive collection of all stocks traded in the
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets. I form two subsamples by condi-
tioning the original sample on the signs of the contemporaneous difference
between CRSP returns ( ) and S&P 100 returns.CRSPrt
Table 4 reports the regression results from these two subsamples. The slope
in the downside return partition is 8.79 for the subsample andCRSPr rt t
7.13 for the subsample. The difference of 1.66 is statisticallyCRSPr rt t
significant ( ). The difference in slopes implies that the aversion oft 2.41
loss is sharper when the broader market is outperforming the S&P 100.
The slope in the upside return partition is 4.40 for the subsample,CRSPr rt t
and 2.00 for the subsample. The difference of 2.40 is also sta-CRSPr rt t
tistically significant ( ). The preference for gain is also sharper whent 6.70
the broader market is outperforming the S&P 100.
In both downside and upside partitions, the slopes of the risk-return relation
are steeper when the broader market performs better than the S&P 100. The
5. I obtain similar results when the S&P 500 index, a more widely followed index but covering
a narrower universe, is used to proxy the broader market.
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TABLE 4 Results of Two-Partition Asymmetric Regressions of Percentage
Changes in the VIX on Contemporaneous S&P 100 Returns
Conditioned on Higher or Lower CRSP Returns Relative to S&P 100
Returns
Regression Constant r r R2
A. Conditioned on higher
CRSP returns:
A .03 8.79 .61
( 12.18) ( 42.30)
B .00 4.40 .30
( 1.07) ( 15.79)
B. Conditioned on lower
CRSP returns:
C .00 7.13 .45
( 1.60) ( 17.08)
D .01 2.00 .09
( 4.67) ( 10.88)
This table reports results from conditional two-partition asymmetric regressions of daily percentage
changes in the VIX on contemporaneous S&P 100 daily returns rt. The regression equations are A:
; B: ; C:CRSP CRSP%VIX r , conditioned on r r %VIX r , conditioned on r rt t t t t t t t
; and D: . Here,CRSP CRSPC%VIX r , conditioned on r r %VIX r , conditioned on r rt t t t t t t t
and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when ; and are %VIXt and%VIX r r 0 %VIX rt t t t t
rt reduced by removing the days when ; t-statistics are in parentheses.r 0t
impact of the broader market on the S&P 100 risk-return relation appears to
be consistent with the behavior of option traders “keeping up with the Joneses.”
VII. Leverage Hypothesis
I examine the nonbehavioral hypothesis that leverage explains the risk-return
relation. To test the leverage effect, I sort constituent stocks in the S&P 100
independently by previous year-end financial leverage (TD/ME) and operating
leverage (PPE/sales). Within each leverage category, the top 50% form the
high-leverage portfolio and the bottom 50% form the low-leverage portfolio.
I value-weight and rebalance the portfolios daily over the 1986–98 period.
I use the total market equity of the S&P 100 as the common base weight
across all portfolios. In this way, the returns of the low- and high-leverage
portfolios within each leverage category should sum to the returns of the S&P
100.6
A. Two Partitions of Returns
I modify the two-partition asymmetric regressions from equations (3) into
bivariate regressions that encompass the low- and high-leverage portfolios.
6. I find that the sum of the two financial leverage portfolios is virtually identical to the S&P
100 obtained from Datastream. The coefficient of correlation between the returns of the sum
and the S&P 100 is 0.997, and the slope from regressing the sum on the S&P 100 is 0.996. The
same results hold for the operating leverage portfolios.
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TABLE 5 Results of Two-Partition Asymmetric Regressions of Percentage
Changes in the VIX on Contemporaneous Leverage-Sorted Portfolio
Returns
Regression
A. Financial Leverage (TD/ME)
Constant rloFIN rhiFIN rloFIN rhiFIN R2
D .02 6.70 12.41 .60
( 11.37) ( 13.22) ( 13.11)
U .01 2.08 3.24 .14
( 4.14) ( 6.33) ( 5.43)
B. Operating Leverage (PPE/Sales)
Constant rloOP rhiOP rloOP rhiOP R2
D .02 4.96 11.22 .60
( 10.73) ( 6.84) ( 21.01)
U .01 4.08 1.26 .15
( 4.18) ( 9.25) ( 3.63)
This table reports results from regressing daily percentage changes in the VIX on contemporaneous
S&P 100 leverage-sorted portfolio daily returns rt. I sort stocks in the S&P 100 into two FIN groups by
previous year-end financial leverage (total debt/market equity) or into two OP groups by operating leverage
(net PPE/net sales). The breakpoints are the respective medians. I denote the low-leverage group as loFIN or
loOP and the high-leverage group as hiFIN or hiOP. Stocks in each group are value-weighted into a portfolio.
I use the total market equity of S&P 100 as the common base weight across all portfolios. The portfolios are
rebalanced daily over 1986–98. The regression equations are D: ; and U:%VIX r rt lo lo,t hi hi,t
. Here, and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when%VIX r r %VIX rt lo lo,t hi hi,t t t
; and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when ; t-statistics are in parentheses.r 0 %VIX r r 0t t t t
For example, the regression equations for the two financial leverage portfolios
are
(D) %VIX r r ,loFIN loFIN hiFIN hiFIN
(U) %VIX r r . (7)loFIN loFIN hiFIN hiFIN
I denote the low- and high-financial leverage portfolios by the subscripts
“loFIN” and “hiFIN,” and the low- and high-operating leverage portfolios by
“loOP” and “hiOP,” respectively. To provide uniformity across all portfolios,
I base the downside and upside partitions on the signs of the S&P 100 returns,
not on the individual portfolio returns. A priori, if the leverage hypothesis is
true, high-leverage portfolios should have greater sensitivity in the risk-return
relation than the low-leverage portfolios. This difference in sensitivity trans-
lates into steeper slopes in both partitions for high-leverage portfolios than
for low-leverage portfolios. Table 5 reports the results.
In the downside return partition, the slope of the hiFIN portfolio ( 12.41)
is more negative than the slope of the loFIN portfolio ( 6.70). The difference
is statistically significant ( ).7 Similar difference in slopes holds fort 4.08
the operating leverage portfolios ( ). The R2 in the downside partitiont 5.21
for either leverage category is 0.60. The results suggest that high-leverage
stocks have a more sensitive (steeper) risk-return relation relative to low-
7. I evaluate the statistical significance of the difference from the regressionhiFIN loFIN
The coefficient b is equivalent to .1%VIX a b(r r ) c r . ( )hiFIN loFIN S&P100 hiFIN loFIN2
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leverage stocks. Financial and operating leverages appear to support the lev-
erage hypothesis in this partition.
In the upside return partition, the slope of the hiFIN portfolio ( 3.24) is
again more negative than the slope of the loFIN portfolio ( 2.08). However,
the difference is not statistically significant ( ). For the operatingt 1.33
leverage portfolios, I observe the opposite: loOP is steeper than hiOP (t
). Support for the leverage hypothesis does not appear robust. In fact, the3.85
hypothesis is actually contradicted by the operating leverage portfolios. The
R2 in the upside partition for either leverage category (0.14 or 0.15) is sub-
stantially lower than that in the downside partition, which implies that the
risk-return relation is weaker when prices rise. If upside volatility matters less
than downside volatility in the overall perception of risk, then the weaker
relation in the upside partition is not surprising.
Generally, within each portfolio, the slope in the downside partition is more
negative than the corresponding slope in the upside partition ( ,hiFIN hiFIN
, , ). Such within-portfolio differences inloFIN loFIN hiOP hiOP loOP loOP
slopes further support the proposition that downside returns exert greater
influence than upside returns in the market’s overall perception of risk.
B. Robustness Check
To check whether financial leverage does indeed explain the asymmetric risk-
return relation, I subdivide the loFIN portfolio into loFINQ1 and loFINQ2. The
former comprises stocks within the smallest financial leverage quartile. The
latter comprises stocks within the second smallest financial leverage quartile.
If the leverage hypothesis is true, a monotonic, decreasing relation should be
seen in the slopes of loFINQ1, loFINQ2, and hiFIN (i.e., increasing downward-
sloping steepness).
Table 6, panel A, presents the results from the two-partition asymmetric
regression. In the downside partition, the relation in slopes is indeed mono-
tonic, progressively becoming steeper as financial leverage increases. How-
ever, in the upside partition, the relation is no longer monotonic—the slope
of loFINQ2 is less steep than that of loFINQ1.
Panel B of table 6 presents results from subdividing the hiFIN portfolio
into hiFINQ3 and hiFINQ4. Here I separate the hiFIN stocks into two equal
groups according to the seventy-fifth percentile breakpoint in financial lev-
erage. In neither the downside nor upside partition is there a monotonic relation
in slopes.
Therefore, it appears that the leverage hypothesis offers only a weak non-
behavioral explanation for the asymmetry. A better explanation might be
gained from other nontraditional perspectives.
VIII. Conclusion
In this article, I investigate the nature of the relation between option traders’
risk perception and contemporaneous market conditions. The VIX is arguably
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TABLE 6 Results of Two-Partition Asymmetric Regressions of Percentage




Constant rloFINQ1 rloFINQ2 rhiFIN rloFINQ1 rloFINQ2 rhiFIN R2
D .02 3.68 9.87 12.30 .60
( 10.81) ( 4.36) ( 11.32) ( 13.08)
U .01 2.59 1.50 3.24 .14
( 4.01) ( 5.10) ( 2.77) ( 5.44)
B. Subdivide hiFIN
Constant rloFIN rhiFINQ3 rhiFINQ4 rloFIN rhiFINQ3 rhiFINQ4 R2
D .02 5.67 21.07 7.90 .60
( 10.59) ( 10.45) ( 10.69) ( 6.07)
U .01 2.48 1.40 5.61 .15
( 4.07) ( 7.31) (1.14) ( 6.92)
This table reports results from regressing daily percentage changes in the VIX on contemporaneous
S&P 100 leverage-sorted portfolio daily returns rt. I sort stocks in the S&P 100 into two FIN groups by
previous year-end financial leverage (total debt/market equity). The breakpoint is the median. I denote the low-
leverage group as loFIN and the high-leverage group as hiFIN. In panel A, I subdivide loFIN into two groups,
loFINQ1 and loFINQ2, using the twenty-fifth percentile breakpoint. Stocks in each group are value-weighted
into a portfolio. I use the total market equity of the S&P 100 as the common base weight across all portfolios.
The portfolios are rebalanced daily over 1986–98. The regression equations are D: %VIXt
; U: . Here,r r r %VIX r r rloFIN loFIN ,t loFIN loFIN ,t hiFIN hiFIN,t t loFIN loFIN ,t loFIN loFIN ,t hiFIN hiFIN,tQ1 Q1 Q2 Q2 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q2
and are %VIXt and rt reduced by removing the days when ; and are %VIXt and%VIX r r 0 %VIX rt t t t t
rt reduced by removing the days when ; t-statistics are in parentheses. In panel B, instead of subdividingr 0t
loFIN, I subdivide hiFIN into two groups, hiFINQ3 and hiFINQ4, using the seventy-fifth percentile breakpoint.
the best aggregate index of fear or sentiment of sophisticated, well-informed
participants in the most-active index option market. It is not a statistical
estimate, and it is relatively free from a variety of specification and sampling
errors inherent in the various statistical volatility metrics previously employed
in the literature.
I find that this metric of risk perception tends to increase when downside
volatility increases more than upside volatility. This finding lends support to
the semidimensional nature of risk. The risk-return relation is asymmetric and
nonlinear, best described as a downward-sloping reclined S-curve. Extreme
price plunges correlate strongly with rapid increases in risk. Extreme price
rises correlate with relatively subdued decreases in risk. These observations
suggest that fear strikes quickly but exuberance builds slowly. This asymmetry
points to another form of loss aversion.
By conditioning the downside and upside partitions of contemporaneous
returns on the signs of lagged-1-day returns, I find that consecutively falling
prices tend to intensify the fear of risk. The empirical observation that prior
gains have some mitigating effect on loss aversion relative to prior losses
supports the “house money” effect. On the other hand, consecutive price run-
ups have a somewhat, but relatively weaker, reinforcing effect on exuberance.
I also condition on the relative performance of the broader market. The
results show that both the aversion of loss and the preference for gain are
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sharper when the broader market is outperforming the S&P 100. This steeper
risk-return relation supports the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect.
Finally, I find that financial leverage (but not operating leverage) is a plau-
sible explanation for the general negative risk-return relation. However, ro-
bustness checks show that the leading nonbehavioral explanation for the neg-
ative risk-return relation, the leverage hypothesis, is at best a weak one.
In a broader context, whether the risk-return relation arises from leverage
or behavioral peculiarities of option traders or other factors yet to be explored
is only a secondary concern. The primary issue is that the relation is asym-
metric and semidimensional in nature. My results provide empirical evidence
that validates the anecdote that financial markets are volatile only when prices
are falling. More important, my results have implications for the theoretic
construct of the measure of financial risk and its empirical quantification.
My focus here is on the volatility that matters. My evidence suggests that
risk does not conform to the paradigm of simple symmetry, as mainstream
financial research assumes. This article raises a new awareness of the semi-
dimensional nature of risk.
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